Is Being Wicked For Good a Jewish Concept?

Dear Jew in the City-

Is being wicked for good a Jewish concept?

All the best,

Linda

Dear Linda-

Thanks for your question. Before I answer it, let me just say that I see what you did there. I can answer this question, but as of this writing I have not yet seen the movie you reference, so I can’t make any specific tie-ins to it. (Sorry about that!)

Being “wicked for good,” i.e., doing the wrong thing for the right reason, is called an aveirah lishmah, a sin committed for Godly reasons. This is discussed in the Gemara, but this requires a big caveat: the Gemara is not a book of law per se. The Talmud reflects the discussions that took place in the academies of learning over the course of centuries. A Talmudic dictum can’t be taken as license for bad behavior. We have many centuries of legal codes – the Mishneh Torah, the Shulchan Aruch, the Mishnah Berurah and more. These works give us instruction for practical application.

That being said, let us turn to the Gemara in Nazir 23b. There it discusses three Biblical people who engaged in illicit sexual relations. Zimri publicly cohabitated with a Midianite woman; he set a bad example for others who imitated him and was ultimately impaled for his trouble. The widow Tamar disguised herself and seduced her father-in-law Yehuda; King David and his entire dynasty are descended from their children. Finally, Yael seduced an enemy general so that she could assassinate him; this is something that is particularly prohibited for a married woman. With all this in mind, let’s see what the Gemara says (paraphrased): 

Ulla points out an interesting contrast: Tamar and Zimri committed essentially the same offense, but she was rewarded with illustrious descendants, while he caused widespread death and destruction. Why this contradistinction? 

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak clarifies that an aveirah committed with pure intentions is more meritorious than a mitzvah performed for ulterior reasons. Rav Yehuda counters that an aveirah committed with pure intentions is as meritorious as a mitzvah done for ulterior reasons, but not more so. At this point, the Gemara cites Judges 5:24: “May Yael…be blessed more than the women in the tent” (referring to the Matriarchs). 

But didn’t Yael derive pleasure from her misdeed? If so, it can hardly be considered purely altruistic! Rabbi Yochanan replied that what’s good in the eyes of evil people is only bad in the eyes of the righteous (i.e., it was no pleasure at all).

There’s a lot to unpack here, not the least of which is that to be lishmah (for Godly reasons), an aveirah must be done completely altruistically. If you think, “Oh, good. Here’s an opportunity to do something I normally couldn’t,” then it’s not an aveirah lishmah; it’s just an aveirah.

Another thing to note is the nomenclature: an aveirah lishmah is still an aveirah; it’s not magically transformed into a mitzvah. Had Yael gone to her rabbi and asked, “May I, a married woman, go and seduce the enemy general so that I can assassinate him?” her rabbi would have replied, “No, of course not.” An aveirah lishmah is not permitted at the outset (l’chatchilah), we only evaluate the underlying intention after the fact (b’dieved). So, praiseworthy as the intention may be, the act is still impermissible.

Let us here distinguish between the archetypical example of driving someone to the hospital on Shabbos. That is not a case of aveirah lishmah. In cases of danger to life and limb, the laws of Shabbos are suspended, so such an act is completely permitted – required, actually! So, if Yael had asked her rabbi if she could drive someone to the hospital on Shabbos, he would have said, “What are you still doing here? Go, go!” 

Getting back, consider also the case of Queen Esther. We are told that she was married to Mordechai. Willing relations with another man render a woman prohibited to her husband, but coercion doesn’t. Esther remained permitted to Mordechai despite her marriage to Achashverosh because she remained completely passive. When she went to the king, she became an active participant, rendering her prohibited to Mordechai. (See Rashi on Esther 4:16, Sanhedrin 74a, et al.) What she did was an aveirah lishmah, and she’s praised for it, but that doesn’t make it consequence-free.

Finally, note our examples of aveirah lishmah. You’ll note that they all have macro repercussions. Tamar, Yael and Esther all saved the nation and/or changed the course of history. A cost/benefit analysis must be made. To be considered praiseworthy, an aveirah lishmah must have a positive result that far outweighs the detriment of the offense committed. I don’t know about you, but I’m not in the position to make such calls.

So, let’s review. There is indeed a concept that a sin committed for altruistic reasons is considered meritorious, but…

• The person performing the action must derive absolutely no pleasure from the sin;
• It’s still a sin and prohibited at the outset;
• Despite being lishmah, that doesn’t mean the aveirah is consequence-free; 
• In order to be considered meritorious, the benefit must far outweigh the detriment of the sin.

While an important moral lesson, a number of authorities say that the concept of aveirah lishmah has absolutely no practical application today. Even if it does, making such a judgment call is certainly beyond the paygrade of you or me.

Sincerely,

Rabbi Jack Abramowitz
Educational Correspondent
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